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Abstract 
 
The conditional interpretation of general categorical statements like ‘All men are animals’ as 
universally quantified material conditionals ‘For all x, if x is F, then x is G’ suggests that the 
logical structure of law statements is conditional rather than categorical. Disregarding the 
problem that the material conditional ‘(x)(Fx  Gx)’ is trivially true whenever there are no 
xs that are F, there are some reasons to be sceptical of Frege’s equivalence between 
categorical and conditional expressions. 
 
Now many philosophers will claim that the material conditional interpretation of laws 
statements, dispositions ascriptions, or any causal claim is generally accepted as wrong and 
outdated. Still, there seem to be some basic logical assumptions that are shared by most of the 
participants in the debate on causal matters which at least stems from the traditional truth 
functional interpretation of conditionals. This is indicated by the vocabulary in the 
philosophical debate on causation, where one often speaks of ‘counterfactuals’, ‘possible 
worlds’ and ‘necessity’ without being explicit on whether or to what extent one accepts the 
logical-technical definition of these notions. To guarantee a non-Humean and non-extensional 
approach to causal relations, it is therefore important to be aware of the logical and 
metaphysical implications of the technical vocabulary. 
 
In this paper we want to show why extensional logic cannot deal with causal relations. Via a 
logical analysis of law-like statements ‘All Fs are Gs’ we hope to throw some new light on 
interrelated notions like causation, laws, induction, hypotheticality and modality. If 
successful, our analysis should be of relevance for a deeper understanding of any type of 
causal relations, whether we understand them to be laws, dispositions, singulars or 
categoricals. 
 
(260 words) 
 
 
I 
 
Aristotelian logic treats general categorical statements such as ‘All men are animals’ 
as basic and primitive. This means that they cannot be further analysed or logically 
deduced. We can see this from the prominent role general categoricals play in the 
syllogisms. Here they often appear as the first premise of a valid inference, defining 
essential properties for a class of objects. With the introduction of Fregean logic, 
general categoricals like ‘All men are animals’ were analysed as universally 
quantified conditionals. Then we get that, among all things in the world, if something 
is a man, then this something is also an animal. This move seems philosophically 
innocent, yet logic has never been the same since. 
 
With the conditional interpretation of categorical, and the material interpretation of 
conditionals, we get logical equivalence between the following expressions: 
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(A) All Fs are Gs. 
(B) If x is F, then x is G. 
(C) (x)(Fx  Gx) 
 
In this paper we argue that there are some logically relevant divergences between (A), 
(B) and (C) and that the move from (A) to (C) is not philosophically innocent. 
 
 
II 
 
Now the most obvious divergence between the three general statements (A) ‘All men 
are animals’, (B) ‘If something is a man, then it is an animal’ and (C) ‘(x)(Fx  Gx)’ 
is with respect to existence claims. That at least (A) and (C) involve existence in 
different ways should be apparent when we compare the so-called logical square of 
the Port Royal logic (fig. 1) with that of Fregean logic (fig. 2): 
 
           All As are Bs      No As are Bs 
 
         Some As are Bs        Some As are not Bs 
 
Figure 1: Port Royal logical square 
 
 
 
            (x)(Fx  Gx)       (x)(Fx  Gx) 
 
       (x)(Fx  Gx)    (x)(Fx  Gx) 
 
 
Figure 2: Frege’s logical square, §12 
 
Although we have existence claims both in categorical statements and in general 
material conditionals, they do not claim existence in the same manner: While ‘All 
men are animals’ asserts existence about men and animals, thereby implying that 
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‘Some men are animals’, the universally quantified material conditional does not 
entail that there exists an x that is F and G. A non-material conditional, ‘If something 
is a man, then it is an animal’, does not involve existence claims about men or 
animals, but is a hypothetical claim about the relation between men and animals. We 
can sum up the relation between (A), (B) and (C) as follows: 
 
(A) ‘All men are animals’ is false if there are no men, while ‘No men are 
animals’ is true if there are no men. We can say that general categorical 
statements have qualitative existential import, entailing that some men are 
animals. 
 
(B) ‘If something is a man, then it is an animal’ asserts a conditional, hence 
hypothetical, relation between being a man and being an animal regardless 
of whether there are any men or animals. Involving no existence claims 
whatsoever, general non-material conditionals have no existential import. 
Hence the existence or non-existence of men or animals will not affect the 
truth-value of the conditional statement. 
 
(C) ‘(x)(Fx  Gx)’ has quantitative existential import. Interpreted as general 
material conditionals, ‘All men are animals’ and ‘No men are animals’ are 
both true if there are no men, while both ‘Some men are animals’ and 
‘Some men are not animals’ are false under this condition. 
 
This should be a first indication that it is not logically irrelevant whether we interpret 
‘All men are animals’ as a categorical, conditional or material claim. 
 
 
III 
 
We have seen that the categorical/conditional distinction points to a divergence in 
existence claims. This difference is less explicit on the level of singular instantiations 
where they both have corresponding conditional expressions: ‘If Fa, then Ga’: ‘If 
Socrates is a man, then he is an animal.’ It is therefore important to be explicit about 
whether we assert a singular expression as a conditional or a categorical statement. 
 
Where a causal relation is expressed, both the generic conditional (If Fx, then Gx) and 
the singular instantiation (If Fa, then Ga) express a purely hypothetical relation 
between antecedent and consequent. Thus they both express hypotheticality with 
respect to the existence of Fs or Gs. In addition, the singular conditional expresses 
hypotheticality with respect to whether the instantiated object is an F or a G. An 
example of a generic statement that we usually take to express a matter of causal 
relation is ‘If a body is not subject to any net external force, it either remains at rest or 
continues in uniform motion’. 
 
Where a classification is expressed, it will be as a general categorical (All Fs are Gs) 
or as a singular conditional (If a is F, then a is G). Since there is no hypotheticality 
involved in the categorical expression, no causal relation is expressed. In the singular 
instantiation, however, the conditional form points to the hypotheticality concerning 
whether the instantiated object is F or G. An example of a generic statement that we 
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usually take to express a matter of classification is the categorical ‘All men are 
mortal’ and the singular instantiation ‘if Socrates is a man, then he is mortal’. 
 
If we understand the logical structure of causal relations to be the categorical rather 
than conditional, then laws, dispositions and causation would all be a matter of 
classification. Understanding the class of Fs as contained in the class of Gs seems to 
rule out the possibility of accepting something that is not G as an F. If all men are 
mortal by essence, an immortal being could not be a man. This indicates why Aristotle 
didn’t have a problem of induction. 
 
Consider also the example of all even numbers being divisible on 2. Were we ever to 
find a number that is not divisible on 2, we would say that it isn’t an even number. - 
Hence no problem of induction. Induction is therefore only part of causal relations, 
not of classifications. This indicates that the logical structure of laws and causal 
relations must be the conditional, hence hypothetical ‘If Fx, then, as a result, Gx’. 
 
Kepler’s first law is often given a categorical form ‘All planetary orbits are elliptic’. 
However, it was never formulated nor meant as categorical statements by Kepler 
himself. To him this would be the same as saying that they are in no need of 
explanation. So in order to make apparent that this law was meant as causal relation, 
he insisted on a conditional reading. Causal relations are in need of explanations 
because they are empirical matters rather than logical ones. 
 
 
IV 
 
Now it seems far from clear in what way or to what extent causal matters like 
causation, laws or dispositions are necessary. Noticing that causal relations involve 
induction while classifications don’t, we should expect different types of necessity to 
be involved. The interpretation of both conditionals and categoricals as the material 
conditional blurs the distinction between them. It also forces a problem of induction 
on all generic expressions,  not only the ones about causal matters. But unlike the 
empirical induction involved in law statements about causal matters, and 
mathematical induction used to prove generic mathematical statements, the logical 
induction is vicious and unproductive. 
 
This becomes particularly clear when we consider how a universally quantified 
material conditional is nothing but a conjunction of the infinite set of corresponding 
singular material conditionals (Fa  Ga) & (Fb  Gb) & …and so on. Thus we get 
entangled with the problem of incompleteness and induction: We will never be able to 
check on all its singular instantiations and conclude that for instance all iron bars 
expand when heated. 
 
In order to preserve the causal relation, therefore, we shouldn’t read the generality as 
‘For all xs’. Rather we should read it as ‘For any x’. Saying that ‘For any iron bars, if 
they are heated, they will expand’, we are challenged to take any iron bar (as many or 
as few as we like) and check whether it expands if heated. In this way the expression 
of ‘any’ – unlike ‘all’ or ‘every’ – points to the hypotheticality, hence potentiality, of 
general causal relations. At the same time it seems to preserve the modality expressed 
in infinite potentialities. 
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What the distinction between ‘any’ and ‘all’ points to, then, is that the distinction 
between hypothetical and categorical statements is essential for understanding causal 
matters. This is because it reveals a distinction between the potentiality and infinity 
expressed in causal relations between two events, and the categorical classification of 
some property F as being defined or classified according to some essential property G. 
 
In a classification, like ‘All men are animals’, we seem to be dealing with a logical 
rather than an empirical and causal matter. This is because a man could never be 
prevented from being mortal. Classification involves no causality whatsoever. For 
instance, a ceteris paribus clause would never even be considered as relevant if we 
understood causal matters as classifications. We could just say that without x being G, 
we wouldn’t even consider it as being F. Hence there is no problem of induction 
involved in classifications. Thus the use of ‘all’ is justified by the classification itself, 
and not by the truth of the sum of all its singular instantiations. In causal relations, it 
is essential that we are trying to predict what will follow from x being F, while no 
such prediction is part of a classification. 
 
 
V 
 
So we need an adequate understanding of conditionals to understand causal relations. 
Taken as a material conditional, however, any statement ‘All Fs are Gs’ will be true if 
there are no xs that are F. This is the so-called problem of counterfactuals. But the 
truth is that there is no problem of counterfactuals without the material conditional 
interpretation. The non-material conditional ‘For all x, if Fx, then Gx’ would never be 
true just because there are no Fs. In fact, the truth, falsity, probability or modality of 
the antecedent as such does not have impact on the truth, falsity, probability or 
modality of the non-material conditional as a whole. A conditional’s truth-value is not 
affected by changing the mode from indicative to subjunctive as long as the 
background conditions remain unchanged. 
 
For instance, the same causal relation is expressed in ‘If I drop this pen, it will fall’, 
‘If I were to drop this pen…’ and ‘If I had dropped this pen…’ etc. So why treat them 
differently? A conditional is true, highly probable, likely, possible or necessary, 
irrespectively of whether or not the antecedent is true. To even have a theory of 
counterfactuals would therefore place us within a mistaken understanding of 
conditionals, hence of causal matters. 
 
Thus a property that is usually associated with counterfactuality, namely 
hypotheticality, is actually an essential aspect of all conditionals that express a 
sufficient/necessary relation between antecedent and consequent. A conditional is 
never factual or counterfactual in the traditional sense, according to the truth or falsity 
of the antecedent. On the contrary, it is always a matter of hypotheticality. 
 
To give a separate account for so-called counterfactuals therefore misses the point that 
the conditional relation is not found in the antecedent (or consequent) as such. A 
conditional relation can only be found, explained, predicted or justified according to a 
certain set of background conditions. Hence any contextual change might interfere 
with the relation. No conditional is necessary in the sense that the truth of some Fx is 
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sufficient for the truth of some Gx irrespectively of everything else. But this only 
points to the fact that causation, laws and dispositions are empirical matters, not 
something to be left to logic alone. 
 
 
VI 
 
The point with this paper has been to show that Frege’s interpretation of both 
conditionals and categoricals as universally quantified material conditionals blurs an 
important logical distinction. This distinction points to the division between causal 
relations and classifications. We have tried to show that causal relations and 
classifications relate differently to matters like existence claims, induction, 
hypotheticality and prediction. If we can be free of the material conditional’s 
influence on these matters, the way should be open for causal realism, where matters 
like potentiality, hypotheticality and causation are taken as fundamental, irreducible 
and as real as it gets. 
